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To Adrien Douady 
 
 
1 An ad hoc epistemology for a didactical gap 
1.1 The didactical gap  
More often than not, the problem of teaching mathematical proof has been addressed 
almost independently from the teaching of mathematical “content” itself. Some 
curricula have exposed learners to a significant amount of mathematics without 
learning about mathematical proof as such (Herbst, 2002, p.288); others teaching 
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mathematical proof as a subject in itself without significantly relating it to concrete 
practical examples (cf. Usiskin, 2007, p.75). The most common didactical tradition 
chooses to introduce proof in the context of geometry—usually at the turn of the 8th 
grade—while completely ignoring it in algebra or arithmetic, where things seem to be 
reduced to ‘mere’ computations. This orientation has changed slightly in the past 
decade with an increasing emphasis on the teaching of proof. However, an implicit 
distinction between form and content has lead to references to teaching ‘mathematical 
reasoning’ (e.g., NCTM standards) or ‘deductive reasoning’ (e.g., French national 
programs) instead of mathematical proof as such which would have moved “form” 
much more to the forefront of the didactical scene.   
Nevertheless, it is generally acknowledged that mathematical proof has specific 
characteristics, among them a formal type of text (the US vocabulary often refers to 
“formal proof”), a specific organisation and an undisputable robustness once 
syntactically correct. These characteristics have given mathematics the reputation of 
having exceptionally stringent practices as compared to other disciplines, practices 
that are not socially determined but inherent to the nature of mathematics itself. 
Hence, the answer to the question: “Can one learn mathematics without learning what 
a mathematical proof is and how to build one?” is “No”. But now one can observe a 
double didactical gap: (i) mathematical proof creates a rupture between mathematics 
and other disciplines (even the ‘exact sciences’) and (ii) a divide in the course of 
mathematical teaching during the (almost) standard first 12 years of education (into an 
era before the teaching of proof and one after). 
The origin of these gaps lies at the crosspoint of several lines of tension: rigor versus 
meaning, internal development versus application-oriented development of 
mathematics, ideal objects defined and manipulated by symbolic representations 
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versus experience-based empirical evidence. I do not analyse these tensions here; I 
mention them to evoke the complexity of the epistemological and didactical problems 
which confront us.  
One source of the didactical problems is that teaching must take into account the 
learners’ initial understanding and competence: We can teach only to ones who 
know… The learners’ existing knowledge often proves resistant, especially because 
the learners may have proven its efficiency, as in the case of their argumentative 
skills. In order to overcome this difficulty, teachers organize situations, mises en 
scène and discourses in order to “convince” or “persuade” learners (in the vocabulary 
of Harel & Sowder, 1998). Argumentation seems the best means to this end. It works 
both as a tool for teaching and as a tool for doing mathematics for a long while.  But 
then learners suddenly face an unexpected revelation1: In mathematics you don’t 
argue, you prove… 
Looking to bridge this transition, mathematics educators have searched for ideas in 
psychology. In the middle of the 20th century, the success of Piaget’s ‘stage theory’ of 
development suggested that proof could be taught only after the required level of 
development had been reached2. As a result, mathematical proof was introduced 
suddenly in curricula (if at all) in the 9th grade – generally, the year that students have 
their 13th birthday.  However, this strategy has not worked so well, suggesting to some 
that Piaget may have been wrong.  
                                                 
1 Argumentation means here “verbal, social and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the 
acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of one or more propositions to justify this 
standpoint” (van Eemeren et al., 2002, p.xii). "In argumentative discussion there is, by definition, an explicit or 
implicit appeal to reasonableness, but in practice the argumentation can, in all kinds of respects, be lacking of 
reasonableness. Certain moves can be made in the discussion that are not really helpful to resolving the difference 
of opinion concerned. Before a well-considered judgment can be given as to the quality of an argumentative 
discussion, a careful analysis as to be carried out that reveals those aspects of the discourse that are pertinent to 
making such a judgment concerning it reasonableness." (ibid., p.4) 
2 See e.g. Piaget J. (1969) p. 239: "L’enfant n’est guère capable, avant 10-11 ans, de raisonnement formel, c’est-à-
dire de déducation portant sur des données simplement assumées, et non pas sur de vérités observées". More 
precisely, For more, c.f.  Piaget J. (1967)  Le jugement et le raisonnement chez l’enfant. Delachaux et Niestlé.  
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Some mathematics educators then turned to psychologies of discourse and learning, 
feeling that the followers of Piaget had not paid enough attention to language and 
social interaction. Some suggested the ideas of Vygotsky and the socio-constructivists 
could have provided a solution (e.g. Forman et al. 1996).  However, this line of 
thought did not appear to be the panacea either. Then Lakatos’ work seemed to 
suggest that a solution might be found in the epistemology of mathematics itself (e.g. 
Reichel 2002); however, such attempts also failed amid scepticism from 
mathematicians and researchers. 
The responsibility for all these failures does not belong to the theories which 
supposedly underlie the educational designs, but to naive or simplifying readers who 
have assumed that concepts and models from psychology can be freely transferred to 
education.  In particular, they rarely take into account the nature of mathematics as 
content (while often emphasizing the nature of the perceived practice of 
mathematicians). 
My objective here is then to question the constraints mathematics imposes on teaching 
and learning, postulating that, as for any other domain, learning and understanding 
mathematics cannot be separated from understanding its intrinsic means for 
validation: mathematical proof.  First, I address the epistemology of proof, on which 
we could base our efforts to manage or bridge the didactical gap discussed above. 
1.2 The need to revisit the epistemology of proof 
Although apparently a bit simplistic, it may be good to start from the recognition that 
mathematical ideas are not a matter of feeling, opinion or belief. They are of the order 
 5
of ‘knowing’ in the Popperian sense3, by virtue of their very specific relation to proof 
(and proving). They provide tools to address concrete, materialistic or social 
problems, but they are not about the “real” world. To some extent, mathematical ideas 
are about mathematical ideas; they exist in a closed ‘world’ difficult to accept but 
difficult to escape. For this reason, mathematical ideas do not exist as plain facts but 
as statements which are accepted only once they have been proved explicitly; before 
that, they cannot be4 instrumental either within mathematics or for any application.  
However, despite this emphasis on the key role of proof in mathematics, it must be 
remembered that at stake is not truth but the validity of a statement within a well-
defined theoretical context (cf. Habermas, 1999). For example, Euclidean geometry is 
no truer than Riemannian geometry. This shift from the vocabulary of truth to the 
vocabulary of validity, which suggests a shift from proof to validation, is more 
important than we may have realized. Validation refers to constructing reasons to 
accept a specific statement, within an accepted framework shaped by accepted rules 
and other previously accepted statements. From this perspective, mathematical 
validation searches for an absolute proof in an explicit context; it can thus claim 
certainty as a foundational principle.  
This view of validity and proof is antiauthoritarian (Hanna & Janke, 1996, p.891), 
insofar as it assumes a common agreement about a collective and well-understood 
effort. It thus fits the classical conception of what a scientific proof should be, since 
such a proof must clearly not depend on specific individual or social interests. In this 
lies the democratic aspect of mathematical proof, as noted by Hanna. Proving is an 
example of an intellectual enterprise that allows a minority to overcome the opinion 
                                                 
3 Popper (1959)  proposed falsification as the the empirical criterion of demarcation of knowledge, scientific 
theories or models. 
4 Or should not be... 
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of an established majority, according to shared rules.  This is related to an ancient 
meaning of the word "demonstration" in English (e.g., Herbst, 2002, p.287). 
So the concept of proof is not a stand-alone concept; it goes with the concepts of 
“validity of a statement” and “theory”. This has been well explained and illustrated by 
the Italian school, especially Alessandra Mariotti (1997). However, the word “theory” 
is the most difficult for learners.  No such thing is available to learners a priori, and to 
understand what the word means seems out of reach. Nevertheless, learners have 
ideas about mathematics and about mathematical facts. They also have experience in 
arguing about the “truth” of a claim or the “falsity” of a statement they reject; but this 
is experience in argumentation in contexts that are not framed by a theory in scientific 
terms. To construct a proof requires an essential shift in the learner’s epistemological 
position: passing from a practical position (ruled by a kind of logic of practice) to a 
theoretical position (ruled by the intrinsic specificity of a theory).  
In addition, we cannot engage in the validation of ‘anything’ that has not been first 
expressed in a language. This principle applies across disciplines (Habermas, 1999), 
but plays a special role in mathematics, where the access to ‘mathematical objects’ 
depends in the first place on their semiotic availability (Duval, 1995). 
In other words, the teaching and learning of mathematical proof requires mastery of 
the relationships among knowing, representing and proving mathematically. 
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2 A model to bridge knowing and proving 
2.1 Short story 1: Fabien and Isabelle misunderstanding 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Consider the following problem5: 
B
A
C
P
P1
P2
P3I
 
Construct a triangle ABC.  Construct a point P and  its symmetrical point P1 
about A.  Construct the symmetrical point P2 of P about B, construct the 
symmetrical point P3 of P about C.   Move P.  What can be said about the 
figure when P3 and P are coincident?  Construct the point I, the midpoint of 
[PP3].  What can be said about the point I when P is moved?  Explain. 
Figure 1. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Constructing the diagram (Fig.1) with dynamic geometry software6, one can easily 
notice that the point I does not move when one manipulates the point P. This fact 
seems surprising; the crux of the situation is to propose an explanation. 
Let us examine the interaction between a teacher and a student, Fabien, about this 
problem7.  Fabien has observed the fact but he has no insight about the reason: “The 
                                                 
5 From Capponi, 1995, Cabri-classe, sheet 4-10. 
6 e.g. Cabri-geometry (here used for the drawing), or Geometer Sketchpad; or Geogebra or one of the several 
others now available sometimes open access. 
7 A more detailed analysis can be found in Balacheff & Soury-Lavergne (1995), Sutherland & Balacheff (1999). 
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point I does not move, but so what...”  However, he noticed and proved that ABCI is a 
parallelogram.  At this stage, from the point of view of geometry (and of the tutor), 
the reason I stands immobile while P moves should be obvious.  The tutor then 
provides Fabien with several hints but with no results.  After a while she desperately 
insists: “The others, they do not move. You see what I mean? Then how could you 
define the point I, finally, without using the points P, P1, P2, P3?”  Throughout the 
interaction, the tutor is moved by one concern which can be summarized by the 
question: “Don’t you see what I see?”  But Fabien does not see the ‘obvious’; it is 
only when she tells him the mathematical reasons for the immobility of I that the tutor 
provokes a genuine “Aha!” effect... 
In order to explain the immobility of I, the teacher had get the student to construct a 
link between a mechanical world—that of the interface of the software8 – and a 
theoretical world— the world of geometry. Only this link can turn the observed fact 
(the immobility of I) into a phenomenon (the invariance of I). But the construction of 
this link is not straightforward; it is a process of modelling. 
Teacher and student did share representations, words, and arguments so that they 
could communicate and collaborate; however, this did not guarantee that they shared 
understanding. Educators have made considerable efforts to develop representations 
that could make the nature and the properties of mathematical concepts more tangible. 
But these remain just representations with no visible referent; manipulating them and 
sharing factual experience does not guarantee shared meaning.  Nevertheless, they are 
the only means of communication, since in mathematics the referent, in a semiotic 
sense, is itself a representation (i.e., a tangible entity produced on purpose). 
                                                 
8 Another student’s search for an explanation illustrates well what is meant here by mechanical world: “So... I have 
said... But is not very clear... That when, for example, we put P to the left, then P3 compensates to the right.  If it 
goes up, then the other goes down...”  (Sébatien, [prot. 78-84]). 
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In the next section, I will explore this issue of representation and its relation with the 
learners’ building of meaning, and then take up the challenge of defining “knowing” 
in a way that may not solve the old epistemological problem but will provide some 
grounds to build a link between knowing and proving. 
2.2 Trust, doubt and representations 
The fascination for proof without words9, which would give access to the very 
meaning of the validity of a mathematical statement without the burden of 
sophisticated and complicated discourses, is a symptom of the expectations 
mathematics educators have attached to the use of non-verbal representations in 
mathematics teaching. The development of multimedia software, advanced graphical 
interfaces and access to ‘direct manipulation’ of the represented ‘mathematical 
objects’ has even strengthened these expectations. The above story of the Fabien and 
his tutor  misunderstandings is initial evidence that things might be slightly more 
difficult. I will explore this difficulty now, starting with an example coming from 
professional mathematics. 
In 1979, Benoit Mandelbrot noticed in a picture produced by a computer and a printer 
that the Mandelbrot set10—as it is now known, following a suggestion of Adrien 
Douady—was not connected. “A striking fact, which I think is new” Mandelbrot11 
remarked.  John Hubbard, a former PhD student of Adrien Douady’s who became his 
well known collaborator, reported that: 
                                                 
9 See Claudi Alsina and Roger B. Nelsen (2006), Math Made Visual: Creating Images for Understanding 
Mathematics, published by MAA, and a good example in Roger B. Nelsen (1993), Proofs without words: exercises 
in visual thinking, published by MAA. See Hanna (2000, esp. pp.15-18) for an analysis. 
10 Considering the sequence of complex numbers zn+1 = zn
2 + c, the Mandelbrot set (or set M) is obtained by fixing 
z0=0 and varying the complex parameter c. 
11 Quotation from p.250 of Mendelbrot (1980) Fractal aspects of the iteration of zλz(1-z) for complex λ and z. 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. 357 (1) 249 - 259 
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Mandelbrot had sent [them] a copy of his paper, in which he announced the 
appearance of islands off the mainland of the Mandelbrot set M. Incidentally, 
these islands were in fact not there in the published paper: apparently the 
printer had taken them for dirt on the originals and erased them. (At that time, 
a printer was a human being, not a machine). Mandelbrot had penciled them 
in, more or less randomly, in the copy [they] had. (Hubbard 2000 pp.3-4) 
This anecdote reflects two things: first, the efficiency and strength of the computer-
based picture in supporting a conjecture; second, the fragility of this same picture, 
which depends on both the algorithmic and technical conditions of its production.  
Then, Hubbard reported:  
One afternoon, Douady and I had been looking at this picture, and wondering 
what happened to the image of the critical point by a high iterate of the 
polynomial z2 + c as c takes a walk around an island. This was difficult to 
imagine, and we had started to suspect that there should be filaments of M 
connecting the islands to the mainland. (ibid.)  
Soon, Adrien Douady realized that this meant that the set M is connected12, but “the 
proof of this fact is by no means obvious,” he remarked (Douady, 1986, p.162). The 
proof followed after a long process of writing, initiated by a Note aux Comptes-rendus 
in 1982.  After the discovery of the connectedness, images of the set M got 
transformed, offering a more beautiful picture full of colours which, so to speak, 
‘displayed’ the connectivity of M (Fig. 2). 
                                                 
12 Régine Douady remembers that Adrien had been quickly convinced of the connectivity of M, thanks to the 
theoretical argument which convinced him in an astonishingly “simple” way. However, to complete the explicit 
proof took some time (2008, personal communication). 
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The Mandelbrot set for z→z2+c 
before and after the Douady and Hubbard discovery 
Figure 2. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
This case supports the idea of complex relations between representation and 
mathematical objects—or, more precisely, the role of representations as mediators for 
the conceptualisation of mathematical objects. It invites more caution in considering 
evidence in a non-verbal representation.  Not to say that non-verbal representations or 
expressions of an argument are of no value; rather, I emphasize that the frequent 
claim in education that, “A picture is worth a thousand words” has limits and cannot 
be accepted without further examination.  
For example, graphic calculators are widely used by students. They provide students 
with efficient tools for calculus, blending graphical and symbolic representations. The 
use of this technology has led to new problem-solving strategies that take advantage 
of the low cost of exploring of graphical representations. Among them is what Joel 
Hillel (1993, p.29) called “window shopping,” which consists of playing with the 
 12
various possibilities offered by the display.  The diagrams (below) reproduce two 
appearances of the graph of the same function, f(x) = x4-5x²+x+4. As one can ‘see’, 
these pictures can induce different conjectures about, for example, the numbers of 
zeros of the polynomial or its behaviour within the interval [-2, +2] 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Figure 3. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
It is now common for teachers to warn students and teach them strategies to ensure 
reliable, optimal use of their calculators. Still, the problem of knowing how to balance 
trust and doubt when using these machines and looking for conjectures has no 
straightforward answer. Part of achieving this balance depends not only on how 
learners critically organize their explorations but also on the reliability of the 
embedded software.  Consider the case of the function g(x)=sin(ex). Most students are 
prepared to study this function without a priori foreseeing difficulties; that is, until 
their machine displays something like the following picture: 
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Figure 4. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
‘Window shopping’ will not help to answer the questions this display raises. An 
algebraic study will just leave students with a question they probably cannot solve 
with their knowledge of mathematics and computer science. This picture results from 
the interference between the computation of the coordinates of each point to be 
displayed and the choice of which pixel to turn black on the screen. In the end, it is 
the product of a kind of stroboscopic effect, as suggested by Adrien Douady13.  
Producing a ‘correct’ figure would be a matter of first mathematically notating both 
the capabilities and the limitations of the drawing instrument and then using 
sophisticated computational strategies to decide on the intervals at which to plot an 
‘informative’ graph. 
The problem of how students can decide to trust or doubt mathematical 
representations goes beyond graphical representations to include any representation. 
A last example, taken from Luc Trouche work (2003) on computer algebra systems 
demonstrates this. Consider the equation [Ln(ex-1)=x]: One can use a pocket graphical 
                                                 
13 Personal communication 
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calculator to solve it algebraically or to graph it; the two pictures below (from 
Trouche, 2003, p.27) show the respective results. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Figure 5 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The results speak for themselves. The optimal treatment leading to a solution – in this 
case, that this equation has no solution – consists of a formal transformation of the 
algebraic expression, producing [ex-1= ex]. 
The difficulty students may have relates not to their lack of mathematical knowledge 
but to a general human inclination not to question their knowledge and their 
environment unless there is a tangible contradiction between what is expected after a 
given action and what is obtained, as my final example will demonstrate. 
In this case, upper secondary students were asked to tell what is the limit at +∞ of the 
function [f(x)=ln(x)+10sin(x)]. Without a graphic calculator, only five percent of the 
students answered wrongly; with a graphic calculator, which displayed the window 
reproduced below, this number grew to 25 percent (Guin & Trouch, 2001, p.65). 
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Figure 6. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Given such cases of error, teachers and mathematics educators might have to consider 
whether graphic calculators contribute positively to mathematics learning or whether 
students have difficulty shifting from one semiotic context to another. (Other 
examples of common errors include: the value of  is exactly 3.14, or a convergent 
series reaches its limit, or the Fibonacci series U0=1, U1=(1+√5)/2, Un=Un-1+Un-2 is 
divergent). Most such errors, or “misconceptions” to use the 1980s term, are probably 
symptomatic of the students’ knowledge, which can be legitimate in certain contexts 
although possibly wrong mathematically. To analyse this issue further, we must have 
a conceptualization of the students’ knowledge which (i) allows us to make sense of it  
from a mathematical perspective; (ii) is relevant from a cognitive perspective; and (iii) 
opens the possibility of didactical solutions. 
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2.3 A phenomenological definition of knowing 
Studying students’ productions that were mathematically incorrect, the mathematics 
educators of the 1980s usually chose to use the word “misconception”. As noted by 
Jere Confrey (1990), such student errors should be first considered as indications of 
what they know. Comfrey used the generic word “conception” to refer to the rationale 
of students’ answers to a given problem or question.  I postulate that such conceptions 
result from the learner’s interactions with the environment, and that learning is both a 
process and an outcome of the learner’s adaptation to this environment. By 
“environment”, I refer to a physical setting, a social context or even a symbolic 
system (especially now that the latter can be depicted by a technology which 
dynamically materialises it). 
However, only some characteristics of the environment are relevant from the point of 
view of learning.  Educators do not deal with the learner in all his or her social, 
emotional, physiological and psychological complexity, but from a knowledge 
perspective: as the epistemic subject. The same principle applies to the environment, 
which we restrict to the milieu defined as the subject's antagonist system in the 
learning process (Brousseau, 1997, p.57); that is, we only consider those features of 
the environment that are relevant from the epistemic perspective. This means that our 
characterizations of the (epistemic) subject and of the milieu are interdependent 
systemically (and dynamically, since both will evolve during the learning process). 
Pragmatically, the only accessible evidences of a conception are behaviours and their 
outcomes. Our problem is to interpret these in terms of indicators of strategies the 
adapted nature of which must be demonstrated in a model or representation attributed 
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to the student (Brousseau, 1997, p.215)14. The formalisation of a conception I propose 
below aims at providing such a model. Recognizing this interdependence, expressed 
by Noss and Hoyles15 (1996, p.122) as situated abstraction, accepts that people could 
demonstrate different and possibly contradictory conceptions depending on 
circumstances, although knowledgeable observers may ascribe them to the same 
source concept. 
Thus, a conception is attached neither to the subject nor to the milieu, but exists as a 
property of the interaction between the subject and the milieu—its antagonist system 
(Brousseau, 1997, p.57).  The objective of this interaction is to maintain the viability 
of the subject/milieu system (or [S↔M] system) by returning it to a safe equilibrium 
after some perturbation (i.e., the tangible materialization of a problem).  This implies 
that the subject recognizes the perturbation (e.g., a contradiction or uncertainty) and 
that the milieu has features which make the perturbation tangible (since otherwise, the 
milieu may “absorb” or “tolerate” errors or dysfunctions). 
                                                 
14 For the convenience of the English-speaking reader, I take all the references to Brousseau's contributions to 
mathematics education from Kluwer, 1997 but Brousseau’s work was primarily published between 1970 and 1990. 
15 This proposition should be understood in the light of the development of the ‘situated learning paradigm’ of 
Jeane Lave and Etienne Wenger, whose work was published in the early 1990s. 
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
A conception is the state of dynamical equilibrium 
of an action/feedback loop between a subject and a 
milieu under proscriptive constraints of viability.16 
Figure 7 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
From this definition of conception, I can derive a definition of knowing as the 
characterization of a dynamic set of conceptions. This definition has the advantage of 
being in line with our usual use of the word “knowing” while providing grounds to 
understand the possible contradictions evidenced by learners’ behaviours and their 
variable mathematical development. A conception is a situated knowing; in other 
words, it is the instantiation of a knowing in a specific situation detailed by the 
properties of the milieu and the constraints on the relations (action/feedback) between 
this milieu and the subject. 
                                                 
16 These constraints do not address how the equilibrium is recovered but the criteria of this equilibrium.  
Following Stewart (1994, pp. 25-26), I argue that these constraints are proscriptive – they express necessary 
conditions to ensure the system’s viability – and not prescriptive, since they do not tell in detail how equilibrium 
must be reconstructed. 
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This definition of conception provides a starting point but still has to be refined in 
order to make it relevant to our research. To do so, I will now introduce the model 
cK¢17, in order to provide an effective tool to concretely represent and analyze the 
corpus of data obtained from the observation of students’ activities.  This model aims 
to establish a necessary bridge between knowing and proving by providing a more 
balanced role to control structures with respect to the role usually assigned to actions 
and representations. 
2.4 A model to bridge knowing and proving:  cK¢ 
That validation plays a key role in the emergence of ‘knowing’ has been established at 
least since Popper proposed the criterion of falsification and Piaget introduced the 
process of cognitive disequilibrium. This principle is also inherent in a “conception” 
as we define it, adding the explicit condition that a conception is not self-
contradictory. 
“Proving” is the most visible part of the intellectual activity related to validation.  
However, as the Italian school has clearly demonstrated (Boero et al. 1996), proving 
cannot be separated from the on-going controlling activity involved in solving a 
problem or achieving a task. To some extent, “proving” can be seen as an ultimate 
achievement of controlling and validating. No one can claim to know without a 
commitment to and a responsibility for the validity of the claimed knowledge.  In 
return, this knowledge functions as a means to establish the validity of a decision in 
the course of performing a task and even in the process of building new knowledge—
especially in the learning process. In this sense, knowing and proving are tightly 
related.  Hence, a conception is validation dependent: In other words, we can 
                                                 
17 The letters cK¢ stand for : “conception”, “knowing” and “concept”; more about this model is presented and 
discussed on [http://ckc.imag.fr] 
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diagnose the existence of a conception because there is an observable domain in 
which “it works”, in which there are means to validate it and to challenge possible 
falsifications. This is the essence of Vergnaud’s (1981, p.220) statement that problems 
are the sources and criteria of concepts.  
Vergnaud demonstrated that we could characterize students’ conceptions with three 
components: problems, representation systems and invariant operators (1991, 
p.145)18. I take this model as a starting point, with the addition of the related control 
structure. 
Then, I can characterize a conception by a quadruplet (P, R, L, ∑) in which: 
- P is a set of problems; 
This set corresponds to the class of the disequilibria the considered 
subject/milieu [S↔M] system can recognize; in mathematical terms: P 
is the set of problems which can be solved—in pragmatic terms, P is 
the conception’s sphere of practice. 
- R is a set of operators; 
- L is a representation system; 
R and L describe the feedback loop relating the subject and the milieu, 
namely the actions, feedbacks and outcomes. 
- ∑ is a control structure; 
The control structure describes the components that support the 
monitoring of the equilibrium of the [S↔M] system. This structure 
ensures the conception’s coherence; it includes the tools needed to take 
                                                 
18  Vergnaud in fact proposed this definition at the beginning of the 1980's. 
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decisions, make choices, and express judgement on the use of an 
operator or on the state of a problem (i.e., solved or not). 
This model aims at accounting for the [S↔M] system and is not restricted to one of 
its components19. The representation system allows the formulation and the 
manipulation of the operators by the active subject as well as by the reactive milieu. 
The control structure allows expression and discussion of the subject’s means for 
deciding the adequacy and validity of his or her action as well as the milieu’s criteria 
for selecting a feedback. This symmetry allows us both to take the subject’s 
perspective when evaluating his or her knowing and the milieu’s perspective when 
designing the best conditions to stimulate and support learning. Moreover, it gives us 
a framework in which to describe, analyze and understand the didactical complexity 
of learning proof by taking into account the interrelated relevant dimensions: the 
subject, the milieu and the problem. 
In the next section I will give an illustration of this distinctive role of the control 
structure and the light it sheds on the learners’ behaviors we observe and aim at 
understanding. I will then summarize the proposed framework discussing the relations 
we must establish between action, formulation and validation in order to understand 
the didactical complexity of learning and teaching mathematical proof. These three 
dimensions provide the means we need to build a bridge between knowing and 
proving. 
                                                 
19 By extension, one can often refer to students’ conceptions as acceptable given that one can account precisely for 
the circumstances, which are the milieu and the constraints within which [S↔M] functioned. 
 22
3 Proving from a learning perspective 
3.1 Short story 2: Vincent and Ludovic mismatch 
Vincent and Ludovic are two middle school students who had no specific difficulties 
with mathematics.  They volunteered to participate in an experiment that Bettina 
Pedemonte (2002) was carrying out to study the cognitive unity between problem 
solving and proof. The problem was the following: 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Construct a circle with AB as a diameter.  Split AB in two equal parts, AC and 
CB.  Then construct the two circles of diameter AC and CB… and so on.   
 
 
 
 
How does the perimeter vary at each stage?   
How does the area vary? 
Figure 8. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
With no hesitation, the two students expressed – with the formulas they knew well – 
the perimeter and the area of the first steps in the series of drawings.  Their letters 
represent quantities and the formulas are another description of the reality the drawing 
factually displays.  The students conjectured that the perimeter will be constant and 
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that the area decreases to zero. But Vincent noticed that “the area is always divided by 
2…so, at the limit? The limit is a line, the segment from which we started …”.  The 
discussion then continued: 
41. Vincent:  It falls in the segment… the circle are so small. 
42. Ludovic: Hmm… but it is always 2πr. 
43. Vincent: Yes, but when the area tends to 0 it will be almost equal… 
44. Ludovic: No, I don’t think so. 
45. Vincent: If the area tends to 0, then the perimeter also… I don’t know…  
46. Ludovic: I will finish writing the proof. 
Although Vincent and Ludovic collaborate well and seem to share the mathematics 
involved, the types of control they have on their problem-solving activity differ. 
Ludovic is working in the algebraic setting (c.f., Douady, 1985); the control is 
provided by his ensuring the correctness of the symbolic manipulation and his 
knowledge of elementary algebra. Vincent is working in a symbolic-arithmetic 
setting; the control comes from a constant confrontation between what the formula 
“tells” and what is displayed in the drawings. Both students understood the initial 
situation in the “same” way, both syntactically manipulated the symbolic 
representations (i.e., the formulas of the perimeter and of the area), but their controls 
on what they performed were different, revealing that the conceptions they mobilized 
were also significantly different. I deduce that the operators they manipulated 
(algebraic writings, sketching diagrams, etc.), although they coincided from the 
behavioural perspective, were semantically different. Moreover, from this evidence, 
an observer could argue that the students were not addressing the same “problem”; 
Vincent was “baffled” by the gap between what he saw and what he computed, while 
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Ludovic was “blind” to this gap.  (Actually, Ludovic’s knowledge of calculus would 
not have been sufficient to provide any relevant explanation). 
The symbolic representation plays the role of a semiotic mediator between the two 
students’ different conceptions. It allows communication between the students and is 
instrumental for each in controlling the problem-solving process and building a proof. 
We know that two different representations may demonstrate two different 
understandings; however, here one given representation also supports different 
understandings and hence different proofs.  
3.2 The complex nature of proof 
Many theorists have attempted to answer the question of what counts as a proof, from 
either an epistemological or an educational point of view. However, there is no single, 
final answer. The Vincent and Ludovic discussion above confirms that sheer formal 
computation is not enough. As in one of the best previous anecdotes in the history of 
mathematics20, Vincent could well say to Ludovic: I see it, but I don’t believe it. As 
several authors have emphasised, a proof should be able to fulfil the need for an 
explanation; however the explanatory nature of a proof may become the object of an 
even more irreconcilable disagreement than was its rigor. Consider the simple 
mathematical statement: The sum of two even numbers is itself even.  The following 
figures provide a sample of proofs of this statement.  A discussion of these proofs by 
mathematicians, mathematics teachers and learners provokes very different responses 
from each.   
                                                 
20  “Je le vois, mais je ne le crois pas”, wrote Cantor to Dedeking, in 1877,  after having proved that for any 
integer n, there exists a bijection between the points on the unit line segment and all of the points in an n-
dimensional space. 
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Example adapted from Healey and Hoyles, (2000 p.400) 
Figure 9 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The arguments in such a discussion involve three types of critical considerations: the 
search for certainty, the search for understanding and the requirements for a 
successful communication. The complex nature of proof lies in the fact that any effort 
to improve a candidate-proof on one of these dimensions may change its value on the 
other two. There is no clear standard to decide on the correct balance.  Restricting the 
evaluation to the “certainty” side is playing safe, as this side is compulsory for the 
transformation of mathematical ideas. However, such reductionism is not viable from 
a learning perspective, especially when students are first introduced to mathematical 
proof; their control structures are not appropriately evolved.  Educators at this point 
need to give academic status to activities that may not lead to what would be a proof 
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for professional mathematicians but that still make sense as mathematical activities. 
Hence, my proposal to structure the relations between explanation, proof and 
mathematical proof as I did to ground my own work (Balacheff, 1988). This 
structuration distinguished between pragmatic and intellectual proof, and within both 
it identified categories related first to the nature of the student knowing and his or her 
available means of representation. 
The rationale for this organisation (sketched below in figure 10) is the postulate that 
the explaining power of a text (or non-textual “discourse”) is directly related to the 
quality and density of its roots in the learner’s (or even mathematician’s) knowing. 
What is produced first is an “explanation” of the validity of a statement from the 
subject’s own perspective. This text can achieve the status of proof if it gets enough 
support from a community that accepts and values it as such.  Finally, it can be 
claimed as mathematical proof if it meets the current standards of mathematical 
practice.  So, the keystone of a problématiques of proof in mathematics (and possibly 
any field) is the nature of the relation between the subject’s knowing and what is 
involved in the ‘proof’.  
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Figure 10 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
This recognition of a proof’s roots in knowing may justify a statement as strong as 
Harel & Sowder’s that “one's proof scheme is idiosyncratic and may vary from field 
to field, and even within mathematics itself,” (1998, p.275). However, this view 
misses the social dimension of proof, which transcends an entirely subjective feeling 
of understanding (as well as “ascertaining” or “persuading”; Harel & Sowder, ibid., p. 
242). From a didactical perspective, the issue is not psychological but 
epistemological, being directly related to the role a proof plays in building links 
between a theory that provides its framework and means and a statement that it aims 
to validate. The transcendence of a proof, proposed by Habermas (1999) as a 
requirement for a problématique of truth and justification, is a dimension too often 
forgotten in favour of a psychological or sociological analysis of proving. This 
transcendence is not a dogmatic but a pragmatic position which allows the 
construction of knowledge as a collective asset which can be shared and be 
sustainable without depending on its author(s) and circumstance(s) of birth.  
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The technicalities of mathematical proof are then essential, and can be accepted as the 
price for a viable construction of mathematics. In this respect, formal rigour is a 
weapon against the biases that “idiosyncratic proof schemes” may produce. 
3.3 Knowing and proving in the didactical genesis of proof 
Learning mathematics starts with the first years of schooling, at least from an 
institutional point of view. As is well documented, learners at this elementary level 
depend as much on their experience as on the teacher as a reference to distinguish 
between their opinions, their beliefs and their actual knowledge. The criterion for 
assessing this difference rests either in the tangible efficiency of the knowledge at 
stake or in ad hoc validation by the teacher. But the teacher has to rely on knowledge, 
demonstrating that authority is not the ultimate reference. Hence, efficiency and 
tangible evidence are the supports for the validity of a statement: It’s true because we 
verify that it works. Mathematical learners are first of all practical persons; to enter 
mathematics they have to change their intellectual posture and become a theoretician. 
This shift can easily be seen in the passage from practical geometry (the geometry of 
drawings and shapes) to theoretical geometry (the deductive or axiomatic geometry), 
or from symbolic arithmetic (computation of quantities using letters) to algebra. A 
learner making the transition from the practical to the theoretical has to face the 
epistemological difficulty of a transition from knowing in action to knowing in 
discourse: The origin of knowing is in action but the achievement of mathematical 
proof is in language (see below figure 12).  
Again, the tight relationship among action, formulation (semiotic system) and 
validation (control structure) imposes itself (Brousseau 1997). This trilogy which 
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defines a conception, also shapes didactical situations21; there is no validation possible 
if a claim has not been explicitly expressed and shared; and there is no representation 
without a semantic which emerges from the activity (i.e., from the interaction of the 
learner with the mathematical milieu).  
 
Indeed, this passage from mathematics as a tool whose rationale is ‘transparent’, to 
mathematics as a theoretically-grounded means for the production and evaluation of 
explicit validation has a key stepping stone: language; as a symbolic technology 
(Bishop 1991 p.82), not just a means for social interaction and communication. 
Language allows learners to understand and appropriate the value of mathematical 
proof compared with the pragmatic proof they were used to. Now, this language could 
be of lower levels than the naïve formalism mathematicians use; the level of language 
will bind the level of the proof learners can produce and/or understand.  However, 
there is room for genuine mathematical activity at all these levels, provided that the 
learners have moved beyond empiricism and have seen the added value of the 
theoretical posture (see figure 12 below).  
                                                 
21 figure 11 below sketches the interactions between these three poles 
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This figure illustrates the approximate mapping between 
the critical categories in each of the three dimensions 
(action, formulation and validation). It points the most 
difficult problem for teacher, that is to provide students 
with the means to switch from a pragmatic approach of 
truth to a theoretical approach of validity based on 
mathematical proof. Realising that language is a tool is a 
critical milestone on this move. 
Figure 12 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4 Still an open problem: the situations… 
After a few decades, researchers have now reached a consensus on the variety of 
meanings that proof may have for learners (if not for teachers). Several classifications 
and analyses of the complexity of the different aspects of mathematical proof have 
been extensively reported.  Although they still express significant differences 
(Balacheff, 2008), researchers have converged on considering mathematical proof as a 
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core issue in the challenge of learning and teaching mathematics; mathematical 
knowing and proving cannot be separated. In other words an educational 
problématique of proof cannot be separated from that of constructing mathematical 
knowledge.  
This challenge is well understood from an epistemological perspective.  However, it is 
far from clear from a didactical perspective.  A lot of effort has gone into proposing 
problems and mathematical activities which could facilitate the learning of 
mathematical proof.  At the turn of the 20th century, computer science and human-
computer interaction research have made so much progress that it is possible to 
provide learners and teachers with environments able to provide much more 
mathematically relevant feedback on users’ activities.  Especially, dynamic geometry 
environments and computer algebra systems  allow learners to experience 
conjecturing and refuting in a manner never available before, hence giving them 
access to a dialectic necessary to ground the learning of mathematical proof.  
However, there is some evidence that learners can remain in a pragmatic intellectual 
posture, not catching the value of mathematical proof. 
Prompting the ultimate move from pragmatic to theoretic knowing requires designing 
situations so that the pragmatic posture is no longer safe or economical for the 
learners, while the theoretical posture demonstrates all its advantages. The resultant 
social and situational challenges are levers which one can use to modify the nature of 
the learners’ commitment to proving.  Such design is possible if solving a problem is 
no longer the main issue and fades away behind the issue of being “sure” of the 
validity of the solution.  We already have some examples which witness the 
possibility of designing such situations (e.g., Bartolini-Bussi 1996, Boero et al. 1996, 
Arsac and Mantes 1997, etc.). The scientific challenge is now to better understand the 
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didactical characteristics of these situations and to propose a reliable model for their 
design, for the sake of both researchers and teachers. 
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